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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to look for the presence of the Laffer curve in a non-Leviathan state
using tax rates of 30%, 50% and 70%. We gave the players the opportunity to choose their
labour supply both under a Welfare – State scenario and a State – of – Nature contract. The
main evidence is that a tax rate of 70% is extremely unpopular and significantly decreases
subjects’ labour supply without any benefit on the tax revenue. On the other hand, an
increase of the tax rate from 30% to 50% does not reduce the per capita labour supply while
increasing the tax revenue.
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The assumption that taxes are distortionary leads to the hypothesis that workers’ 
labor supply decreases as the level of taxation increases, if the labor supply 
function is increasing in the wage. Hence, if a proportional income tax is 
introduced, the amount of supplied labor will decrease as the tax rate increases.  
The Laffer curve is a graphical representation of this effect. Some experimental 
evidence supports the Laffer scenario (Sutter and Weck-Hannemann, 2003; 
Lévy-Garboua et al., 2005; Swenson, 1988, Sillamaa, 1999). 
Unfortunately, most of the experimental analyses of the Laffer curve imply 
rather incomplete scenarios. Levy Garboua et al. (2005) and Sutter and Weck-
Hannemann (2003) introduce a ‘Leviathan State scenario’ where the tax 
revenue is not destined to supply services for the taxpayers, while the Swensson 
(1988) and Sillamaa (1999) experiments simply distribute the tax revenue 
equally among participants. 
The aim of our paper is to analyze the reaction of taxpayers as the tax rate 
increases in a more complex scenario of a non-Leviathan state, but rather a 
welfare state. In order to better mimic a real welfare state, we assume that it 
provides two goods: an universalistic insurance and a universalistic public good. 
To incorporate these features we introduce a given level of risk in our 
experiment. Moreover, we assign to the production of public goods the larger 
share of the tax revenue. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the 
experimental model, while the experimental design is described in section 3. 
Section 4 contains the results and section 5 the main conclusions. 
 
2. The experimental model: theoretical background. 
This experiment follows Ortona et al. (2006) where a welfare state and a no-
state scenario are compared. In this experiment we apply the strategy method to 
compare different tax rates in the Welfare State. We use as a benchmark the no-
state scenario where participants are subject to risk but they are not required to 
pay taxes. Consequently, there is no insurance nor public good. We labeled it as 
State of Nature. On the other hand, in the Welfare State – whatever the 
treatment – participants are subjected to risk and are burdened with a 
proportional income tax that will finance a universal insurance and a residual 
public good. 
In our experiment, we pay a wage of 1 euro for each unit of labor. Both in 
the State of Nature and in the Welfare State there is 1 out of 6 probability to lose 
50% of the total wage and 1 out of 36 probability to lose it all. As we said, in 
the Welfare State a proportional income tax is levied. Part of the revenue is 
employed to compensate the unlucky ones. The income of those who lost all 
(half) the income is restored to 80% (90%) of their after-tax income in the 
absence of loss. The remainder of the tax revenue is equally distributed among 
the subjects that participate in the Welfare State – this is the public good. 
Consequently, labor in the State of Nature has an expected marginal 
income for unit of labor (for the subject) equal to  
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Obviously, labor in the Welfare State gives the same expected income as in the 
State of Nature, but a part of it is distributed by the subject to the other 
participants in the Welfare State. In fact, the subject receives only the fraction 
1/n of the residual public good. We may divide the revenue of a unit of labor as 
follows. The expected net wage is equal to 
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the expected insurance is 
 











4 . 0 1 t                                                                              (2) 
 
and the expected residual public good is 
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where: 
t: tax rate 
n: number of individuals in the Welfare State. 
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In our treatments the value of (3) (between 0.204 and 0.4) is always higher than 
the value of (2) (never greater than 0.1). This supports the idea that insurance is 
not the main function of our Welfare State. As it usually happens in experiments 
on public goods, we assume that an egalitarian redistribution is tantamount to 
the production of a universalistic public good. 3. Experimental design. 
The experimental design consists of three treatments with different values of the 
tax rates: 30%, 50% and 70%. All the sessions were run at the Laboratorio di 
Economia Sperimentale e Simulativa (AL.EX) of the University of Eastern 
Piedmont, in Alessandria, Italy
1. 
In all treatments participants were requested to carry out a secretarial task. 
In particular, they were asked to copy information about fictitious students 
(enrolment number, name, surname and mark) into a file, in blocs of 9. Each 
task (i.e., to copy a bloc) was paid 1 euro (before taxes, if the case). After some 
unpaid training, participants were requested to choose the number of blocs they 
were willing to copy. Participants were informed that the computer would signal 
mistakes and wait for corrections, and therefore the blocs had to be copied 
exactly. A 50% fine was established for those who completed a smaller number 
of tasks than freely chosen. After the training task, but before the choice of the 
number of blocs to be copied, the participants were informed of the 
characteristics of their working contracts. Two contracts were submitted, one 
corresponding to the State of Nature (SN) and the other to the Welfare State 
(WS). Participants were requested to state the number of tasks they wanted to 
carry out under each contract (strategy method), and informed that the 
assignment to one of the two contracts was to be decided, randomly, only after 
their decision. At the time of the choice it was common knowledge that two-
thirds of the participants worked under WS contract and one third under SN 
contract. After choosing the number of tasks, but before the assignment to one 
of the contracts, participants were requested to state their preference for one of 
the contracts, on a 5-point scale (from strong preference for SN to strong 
preference for WS). Each participant could leave the lab whenever s/he wanted. 
There was no time constraint and the end of each session corresponded to the 
end of the experiment for the last participant. There was no show-up fee. 
 
The Contracts.  Under the first contract (State of Nature), each participant, 
after having carried out his job, was asked to toss two dice: if the sum was 2 (1 
out of 36) all the earned income was lost; if the sum was 7 (1 out of 6) half of it 
was lost
2. The risk was known to participants at the moment of the choice of the 
number of tasks to carry out. In the second contract (Welfare State), the wage 
and the risk were the same, but the wage was burdened by respectively a 30% 
(1
st treatment), 50% (2
nd treatment), or 70% tax (3
rd treatment). However, the 
participants were informed that the tax revenue would have partially refunded 
the unlucky ones, bringing the income of those who tossed a 2 (7) to 80% (90%) 
of their after-tax income. After that, what was left of the tax revenue was going 
to be divided equally among all the members of the group, irrespective of 
individual contribution. 
                                                 
1 The program was written by the programmer of the Laboratory, dr. Marie-
Edith Bissey. 
2 This “experimental risk” is a metaphor for the risks necessarily connected to 
any economic activity, be it bankruptcy, theft, illness or whatever.   We performed one session for each treatment, with 21, 22 and 18 undergraduate 
students of the faculties of Political Sciences and Law. No student took part in 
more than one session. Altogether, 61 students participated in the experiment. 
 
4. Results 
Result 1. Subjects’ labor supply significantly decreases only when tax rate 
grows from 50% to 70%, while per capita tax revenue significantly increases 
only when tax rate shifts from 30% to 50%.  
From Table 1, it turns out that subjects strongly reduce their labor supply
3 
– and, consequently, the level of their output – in the Welfare State scenario 
when tax rate grows from 50% to 70%. A Kruskal – Wallis test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the observations come from the same population (p = 0.077). 
Mann – Whitney tests run on pairs of treatments confirm that there is no 
difference between the labor supply when the tax rate is 30% and when it is 
50% (p = 0.69), while subjects work significantly less when the tax rate shifts 
from 50% to 70% (p = 0.02). To check whether this difference is due to the tax 
rate and not to subjects’ different characteristics, we run a Kruskal – Wallis 
test on the median labor supply provided in each treatment under the State of 
Nature. This choice is due to the fact that the State of Nature has the same 
features in all the treatments. If the null hypothesis is not rejected when we 
consider the State of Nature, but it is when we consider the Welfare State, we 
may deduce that the differences are due to the contract features and not to the 
characteristics of the population. The test does not reject the null hypothesis 
that the observations come from the same population (p = 0.42). 
 
Table 1 
  Per capita labor supply in contract… 
When tax rate is…   …SN  …WS 
30%  15.24 17.24 
50%  17.23 18.77 
70%  13.28 12 
  
At the same time, if we analyze the per capita tax revenue
4 (Table 2), it 
turns out that it increases as the tax rate changes from 30% to 50%, but that it 
decreases as the tax rate shifts from 50% to 70%. A Kruskal – Wallis test on 
the median per capita tax revenue rejects the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference among the treatments (p = 0.014). In particular, per capita tax 
revenues are significantly different between the 30% and the 50% treatment (p 
= 0.005), but not between the 50% and the 70% treatment (p = 0.307). 
                                                 
3 As we mentioned in the previous paragraph, we used the strategy method and 
we asked each participant to choose the number of tasks they were willing to 
perform under each contract. Per capita effort under each contract is computed 
on the basis of the aggregate output declared by all the subjects, and not only 
by those afterwards assigned to that contract. 
4 We refer to the potential per capita tax revenue, before dice are thrown. If we run an OLS regression (Table 4) where we check the effect of the 
tax rate – through treatment dummies (T50 and T70) - on the individual tax 
revenue, we find a positive and significant coefficient in both cases. At the 
same time the 50% and the 70% tax rates have no different effect on the tax 
revenue (χ
2 test, p > 0.503). This means that when the tax rate shifts from 30% 
to 50% the tax revenue significantly increases, while this is not the case when 
the tax rate increases up to 70%.  
 
Table 2 
  Per capita tax revenue 
When tax rate is    
30%  5.17 
50%  9.39 
70%  8.4 
 
 




  Preferred contract   
When tax rate is  SN  WS  Indifference Total 
30%  7 10  4  21 
50%  8 11  3  22 
70%  14 0  4  18 
Total  29 21  11  61 
 
From Table 3, it turns out that a tax rate of 70% shifts subjects’ 
preferences towards contract SN, while in the first two treatments (tax rate 
equal to 30% and 50%), most subjects prefer the WS contract. This is 
supported by a Fisher exact test (p = 0.001).  
 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to provide a further test on the existence of a Laffer 
curve. We used tax rates of 30%, 50% and 70% and we gave subjects the 
opportunity to determine their labor supply both under a Welfare – State 
contract and a State – of – Nature contract. The main evidence is that a tax rate 
of 70% is extremely unpopular and significantly decreases the quantity of 
labor that subjects supply without any benefit for the tax revenue. On the other 
hand, an increase of the tax rate from 30% to 50% does not reduce the overall 
labor supply and therefore the tax revenue significantly increases.   References 
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 Table 4 - OLS regression – Dependent variable: Individual tax revenue 
 
  I                        II   III  IV 
 
T50  4.21*** 4.15***  4.15*** 4.15*** 
 (1.4)  (1.43)  (1.44)  (1.44) 
T70  3.23** 3.34**  3.27*  3.7** 
 (1.48)  (1.51)  (1.7)  (1.65) 
Time      -  0.94  0.94  0.99 
   (1.34)  (1.34)  (1.35) 
Contract      -  -0.14  -0.11  -0.28 
   (1.23)  (1.29)  (1.27) 
PrefA      -      -  -0.15      - 
     (1.49)         
PrefB      -      -     -  -0.78 
       (1.34)   
Constant -5.17***  4.57***  4.86***  4.63*** 
 (1.004)  (1.57)  (1.65)  (1.68)   
F 4.85***  2.50**  1.97*  2.05* 
 
T50 = T70  0.45 
 
N  61    61   61 61   
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*     significance at 10% 
**   significance at 5% 
*** significance at 1% 
 
 